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SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS: THE 
NEED FOR A THIRD SENTENCING OPTION 
IN WISCONSIN 
In light of the “Slenderman” trial, it has become abundantly clear that a 
gap exists between the sentencing options available for “Class A” juvenile of-
fenders and “Class  
 B” juvenile offenders.  This Comment proposes an expanded sentencing 
option for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders under the Juvenile Justice Code 
to allow those “Class B” serious juvenile offenders the benefit of extended su-
pervision in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program as is available to “Class 
A” serious juvenile offenders currently. This expansion aims to alleviate the 
concern that certain “Class B” serious juvenile offenders must remain under 
original adult court jurisdiction in order to allow a longer period of supervision 
than is currently available to those “Class B” serious juvenile offenders in ju-
venile court. 
 
I.	 	 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 268	
II.	 	 HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE IN WISCONSIN ........ 272	
A.	 Creation of Juvenile Correctional Systems in America ...... 272	
B.	 Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice Code and Classification of 
Serious Juvenile Offenders ................................................. 275	
III.	 	 JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION VERSUS ORIGINAL ADULT 
JURISDICTION IN WISCONSIN ..................................................... 277	
A.	 Waiver and Reverse Waiver Proceedings ........................... 277	
B.	 Sentencing in Wisconsin: The Difference Between Juvenile 
Court Sentencing and Adult Criminal Court Sentencing ... 282	
C.	 Sentencing in light of the Serious Juvenile Offender 
Program ............................................................................... 284	
IV.	 	 PROPOSAL: EXPAND SENTENCING OPTIONS FOR “CLASS B” 
SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS UNDER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
CODE .......................................................................................... 288	
V.	 	 CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 291	
 
 
 
SNYDER-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:22 PM 
268 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:267 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2014, two twelve-year-old girls inspired by the Internet character 
“Slenderman” were charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide 
after stabbing their friend nineteen times and leaving her in the woods to die.1  
The “Slenderman” trial, as the case has come to be known, has drawn national 
attention because the girls were found competent to stand trial as adults due to 
the severity of their offense.2  State law requires the two twelve-year-old girls 
be charged as adults, because Wisconsin Statutes section 938.183(1)(am) gives 
the adult court jurisdiction over all persons ten years or over who attempted or 
committed first-degree intentional homicide (“Class A” felony), first-degree 
reckless homicide (“Class B” felony), or second-degree intentional homicide 
(“Class B” felony).3  In the reverse waiver hearing to consider whether the girls 
should be transferred to juvenile court the presiding judge refused to move the 
cases to juvenile court stating on record that he believed a transfer would de-
preciate the seriousness of the crime.4  Under the juvenile system, “the girls 
would face only three years of incarceration and extensive supervision until age 
18,” which the judged viewed as an inappropriate sentence.5  This case sheds 
light on concerns about how to prosecute juvenile offenders that commit espe-
cially heinous crimes, namely, whether juvenile offenders are best served under 
the juvenile justice code or need to be prosecuted under the adult criminal code.6 
In Wisconsin, the type of offense committed by a juvenile dictates classifi-
cation.7  A juvenile can commit a large variety of offenses that are categorized 
 
1. Jason Hanna & Dana Ford, Police: Wisconsin Girl, 12, Stabbed 19 Times; Friends Arrested, 
CNN (June 2, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/02/justice/wisconsin-girl-stabbed/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8QUC-6DWL].  
2. Bruce Vielmetti, Girls in Slender Man Stabbing Case to Remain in Adult Court, MILWAUKEE 
JOURNAL SENTINEL, (Aug. 10, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/crime/girls-in-slender-man-
stabbing-case-to-remain-in-adult-court-b99553843z1-321293491.html [https://perma.cc/JJ6P-
H6NW]. 
3. WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(am) (2013–2014).  
4. Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
5. Vielmetti, supra note 2; WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2)(a)–(c) (2013–2014) stating that the adult 
court may reverse waive a child to juvenile court if the child proves by the preponderance of evidence  
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the 
criminal justice system. (b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to 
exercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness 
of the offense. (c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile 
or other juveniles from committing the violation of which the child is accused 
under the circumstances specified in s. 938.183(1)(a), (am), (ar), (b), or (c), 
whichever is applicable. 
6. Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
7. WIS. STAT.  § 938.183(1)(a)–(c). 
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as different classes of felonies, which will subsequently dictate the sentencing 
options available to the judge; however, only “Class A” and “Class B” offenses 
are relevant to this Comment.8  The “Class A” distinction is only given to those 
juveniles charged with first–degree intentional homicide, and under “Class A” 
a juvenile who is placed in the “Serious Juvenile Offender Program” can be 
held in secure custody in a juvenile correctional facility up until his or her 
twenty-fifth birthday.9  Unlike “Class A,” the “Class B” serious juvenile of-
fenders, including those charged with attempted first-degree intentional homi-
cide, second-degree intentional homicide, or first-degree reckless homicide, 
can only be held in secure custody in a juvenile correctional facility for up to 
three years.10  This limit on placement may deter the adult court from finding a 
transfer to juvenile court jurisdiction appropriate and require the adult court, 
instead, to retain exclusive jurisdiction if it finds a longer sentence is necessary 
to deter the juvenile and protect the public.11 
This Comment explores the gap that exists between sentencing options for 
those serious juvenile offenders classified as “Class A” and those classified as 
“Class B.”  It focuses exclusively on the need for expanded sentencing options 
for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders, largely, in order to avoid the concern 
that courts should maintain adult jurisdiction.  The Serious Juvenile Offender 
Program only offers three years of supervision for “Class B” offenders and be-
cause there is no option for extended placement, the only available alternative 
is placement under adult court jurisdiction.12 
First, this Comment will outline the history of Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice 
 
8. WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1)(a) (2013–2014) states that “[e]xcept as provided in sub. (2), whoever 
causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class 
A felony”; WIS. STAT. §939.32(1)(a) (2013–2014) states “[w]hoever attempts to commit a crime for 
which the penalty is life imprisonment is guilty of a Class B felony.” 
9. WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1)(a); WIS. STAT. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m) (2013–2014) states:  
If the participant has been adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that 
would be a Class A felony if committed by an adult, placement in a Type 1 juve-
nile correctional facility or a secured residential care center for children and youth 
until the participant reaches 25 years of age, unless the participant is released 
sooner, subject to a mandatory minimum period of confinement of not less than 
one year.  
State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶120, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144 (noting that the dispositional order 
for extended placement for serious juvenile offenders only applies to those juveniles given disposi-
tional order before their eighteenth birthday).  
10. WIS. STAT. § 939.32(1)(a) (2013–2014); WIS. STAT. § 938.538(3)(a)(1) (2013–2014) states 
that the following sanction can be given”[s]ubject to subd. 1m., placement in a Type 1 juvenile correc-
tional facility or a secured residential care center for children and youth for a period of not more than 
3 years.” 
11. Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
12. § 938.538(3)(a)(1). 
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Code and discuss the relevant legislative history of Wisconsin Statutes section 
938.183(1)(am) beginning with the creation of the Juvenile Justice code in 
1996.13  Additionally, it will discuss the relevant Supreme Court cases and Wis-
consin case law to highlight the distinction between adult and juvenile sentenc-
ing.14  Second, this Comment will discuss the creation of the Serious Juvenile 
Offender program and highlight the sentencing options for those juveniles who 
are considered serious juvenile offenders.15  Last, this Comment will demon-
strate the need for a third option for “Class B” serious juvenile offenders. 
Wisconsin’s need for extended placement options for “Class B” serious ju-
venile offenders has become more apparent since the waiver proceedings of the 
Slenderman case have begun.  This Comment will demonstrate why the Wis-
consin legislature should create more sentencing options for judges regarding 
serious juvenile offenders.  Specifically, Wisconsin should consider extending 
the ability to hold serious juvenile offenders until the age of twenty-five to those 
classified as “Class B” offenders and not just limit that option to those classified 
as “Class A” offenders.  Where both “Class A” and “Class B” offenders are 
considered serious juvenile offenders and are subject to original adult court ju-
risdiction for criminal proceedings, the options available to a judge during sen-
tencing should be similar and not distinguished by whether the violent act was 
simply attempted or completed.16 Instead, “Class B” offenders are often subject 
to adult court jurisdiction because there are increased sentencing options avail-
able to meet concerns addressed in reverse waiver hearings and may in turn be 
forced to serve a much harsher sentence.17 
This Comment does not focus on the differences between adolescent and 
post-adolescent brain development in judgment or impulse control, nor does it 
aim to highlight whether juvenile offenders should be treated as fully culpable 
adults.18  While this Comment recognizes the contrast between the environ-
ment, treatment, and consequences of adult and juvenile correctional systems 
 
13. Marygold S. Melli, Symposium: Juvenile Justice Reform: Introduction: Juvenile Justice Re-
form in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375.  
14. Id.; Jaime L. Preciado, Special Issue: Comment, The Right to a Juvenile Jury Trial in Wis-
consin: Rebalancing the Balanced Approach, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 571.  See generally Katherine Hunt 
Federle, Symposium: Juvenile Justice Reform: Emancipation and Execution: Transferring Children to 
Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447. 
15. See generally Kenneth M. Streit & John T. Chisholm, Expand Sentencing Options for Young 
Adults, WIS. LAW., May 2013, at 38.  
16. §§ 938.183(1)(am), 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m).  
17. Vielmetti, supra note 2; State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶ 46, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.  
18. See generally Melissa S. Caulum, Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Discon-
nect Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729.  
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and in part relies on the research regarding the opportunities a juvenile correc-
tional facility offers, the main purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate the 
gap that exists in sentencing serious juvenile offenders that are classified as 
“Class B” offenders.19 
In Part I, the Comment explores the history of juvenile justice codes as a 
separate system for prosecuting juvenile offenders including its deviation from 
the traditional adult court criminal proceedings and the Juvenile Justice Code 
in Wisconsin.  Part II discusses the use of waiver and reverse waiver proceed-
ings for severe offenses that fall under original, exclusive adult jurisdiction.  
Additionally, this Part will discuss the Serious Juvenile Offender Program cre-
ated by Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538 and the sentencing options availa-
ble to court depending on the age of the offender and the nature of the offense, 
namely, whether the offense is classified as a “Class A” or “Class B” felony.  
This Part also demonstrates how different offenses have different sentencing 
options under the Juvenile Justice Code.  Part III details a proposed “third op-
tion” for serious juvenile offenders that commit a “Class B” felony.  Specifi-
cally, Part III suggests an extended placement option in the juvenile proceed-
ings rather than limiting the judge’s sentencing discretion to three-year 
sentences under juvenile jurisdiction or potentially harsher sentences (up to 
sixty years)20 under adult criminal court jurisdiction. 
 
19. Id.; § 938.538(3).  
20. WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3) (2013–2014): 
(3)  Penalties for felonies are as follows: 
(a)  For a Class A felony, life imprisonment. 
(b)  For a Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 60 years. 
(c)  For a Class C felony, a fine not to exceed 100,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 40 years, or both. 
(d)  For a Class D felony, a fine not to exceed 100,000 or imprisonment not 
to exceed 25 years, or both. 
(e)  For a Class E felony, a fine not to exceed 50,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 15 years, or both. 
(f)  For a Class F felony, a fine not to exceed 25,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 12 years and 6 months, or both. 
(g)  For a Class G felony, a fine not to exceed 25,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 10 years, or both. 
(h)  For a Class H felony, a fine not to exceed 10,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 6 years, or both. 
(i)  For a Class I felony, a fine not to exceed 10,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 3 years and 6 months, or both. 
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II. HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE IN WISCONSIN 
A. Creation of Juvenile Correctional Systems in America 
In 1899, the first juvenile corrections system was established in Cook 
County, Illinois, as a response to the increasingly prevalent concern that juve-
niles were vulnerable and more likely to commit delinquent acts.21  The idea 
was to create a juvenile court distinct from the criminal court with a focus on 
rehabilitation, rather than punishment.22  Instead of sentencing juveniles to 
prison, the juveniles were committed to institutions where the primary goal was 
to intervene and provide correctional treatment that would help prevent juve-
niles from committing more delinquent or criminal acts in the future.23  Thus, 
the juvenile court itself began to take part in the rehabilitation process as it be-
gan its early intervention efforts for children at risk, which included neglected 
or delinquent juveniles.24 
In the juvenile court system, the judges were granted discretion to make 
individualized treatment decisions for each juvenile.25  Under the doctrine of 
parens patriae, the juvenile court decisions replaced the decisions of natural 
parents who were unable or unwilling to intervene in delinquent or neglected 
children’s lives.26  These juvenile proceedings were viewed as “civil” in nature, 
where it removed juveniles from the adult criminal system into a system that 
offered more flexible treatments.27  The goal was to provide individual, flexible 
treatment that focused on the child’s needs rather than the crime.28  This goal 
was furthered by the rejection of traditional criminal prosecution procedures; 
instead, juvenile courts eliminated juries, stopped applying the rules of evi-
dence, created private proceedings, and labeled juveniles “delinquent” rather 
than “guilty” of a specific crime.29  After a delinquency finding, the juvenile 
 
21. Caulum, supra note 18, at 747; Preciado, supra note 14, at 576 (“[J]uveniles, because of their 
age, were more vulnerable and led astray more easily than adults.”). 
22. Preciado, supra note 14, at 576 (“The punitive approach was too limited for a court that 
looked holistically at the situation of the youth, as opposed to a criminal law system that focused on 
punishment and the protection of society.”). 
23. Id. (suggesting that the juvenile justice courts were founded under a belief that “youths were 
amenable to change”). 
24. Melli, supra note 13, at 379 (highlighting that the juvenile court was intended for all problems 
with children). 
25. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 141, 147–48 (1984).  
26. Id. at 148. 
27. Id. at 149. 
28. Id. at 150. 
29. Id. at 150–51. 
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was committed to an institution for correction, where the juvenile was to either 
be released after rehabilitation or kept in custody until the juvenile reached the 
age of majority.30 
While the objective of juvenile court was early intervention for minor crim-
inal or delinquent conduct, there was little consideration as to how the juvenile 
court would address serious juvenile crime.31  As a result, many states gave 
criminal courts jurisdiction over more serious offenses, especially those crimes 
considered to be felonies.32  This distinction between delinquent offenses and 
more serious offenses meant that a prosecutor’s charging decision ultimately 
determined whether the juvenile would be subjected to the traditional criminal 
court proceedings or juvenile court proceedings.33  A child under juvenile court 
jurisdiction would not be subject to the procedures of criminal court, including 
those basic Constitutional rights,34 because the focus on rehabilitation and flex-
ible treatment outweighed a juvenile’s access to the due process afforded to 
those cases seen before adult criminal court.35  In the 1920s, criticisms of the 
juvenile court proceedings began to arise because of concerns that the juvenile 
courts had no procedural formalities and judges had too much discretion in 
treatment.36  It was not until the 1960s that the U.S. Supreme Court began to 
recognize that juveniles under the juvenile court proceedings were not afforded 
due process protections or effective rehabilitation services.37  This concern was 
expressed in the 1967 Supreme Court decision, In re Gault.38 
In re Gault was the landmark case that demonstrated the lack of due process 
given to those juveniles subject to juvenile court proceedings.39  This case took 
place in Arizona and involved a fifteen-year-old who allegedly made lewd and 
 
30. Melli, supra note 13, at 380 (“The treatment had no relationship to the crime involved and 
there was great flexibility” depending on lack of resources.). 
31. Id. (noting several reasons why serious juvenile crime was not addressed and suggesting that 
the emphasis on minor criminal conduct may be due to the relatively small amount of serious criminal 
conduct committed by juveniles at the time the code was created or the likelihood that juvenile court 
was not to have jurisdiction over those committing serious crimes).  
32. Id. at 382.  
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 384 (“The assumption of the founders of the juvenile court had been that the state, 
acting in the best interest of the child, would so fully protect the juvenile that there would be no need 
for traditional due process protections.”). 
35. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Access to Justice: Evolving Standards in Juvenile Justice: From 
Gault to Graham and Beyond: Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 65–66 
(2012).  
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 66–67. 
38. Id. at 66; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
39. Birckhead, supra note 35, at 67. 
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offensive phone calls.40  As a result of the phone calls, the juvenile was sen-
tenced to six years and committed to an institution until he reached the age of 
majority.41  Unlike the juvenile in Gault, an adult convicted of the same conduct 
could be sentenced to no more than sixty days in jail under the corresponding 
criminal code.42 
In considering the due process rights afforded to those tried in criminal pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court found the Juvenile Code of Arizona was invalid 
because it did not provide “adequate notice of the charge and the hearing” and 
gave no advice to the juvenile regarding his constitutional rights, such as the 
right to counsel or right to confrontation and cross-examination, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the 
right to appellate review.43  This landmark case opened the door to reconsider-
ing the flexible and informal nature of juvenile court proceedings.44  It led to 
many states implementing more formal procedures and guidelines similar to 
those used in criminal court in the late 1970s and early 1980s.45 
Following the Gault decision, the Supreme Court continued to define the 
due process rights outlined in the juvenile court.46  In In re Winship, a case 
heard in 1970, the Supreme Court ruled that the reasonable doubt standard ap-
plied in juvenile adjudications.47  However, in 1971, the Supreme Court also 
refined juvenile due process rights in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania where the 
Court held there was no constitutional right to a juvenile jury trial.48  The Court 
reasoned a constitutional right to a jury would cause juvenile court to be too 
adversarial because fairness did not require fact-finding through a jury.49  This 
decision departed from Gault and limited the amount of due process rights af-
forded to juveniles in an attempt to remain focused on the original intent of 
 
40. Melli, supra note 13, at 385; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.  
41. Melli, supra note 13, at 385. Note that the age of majority was twenty-one at the time and the 
juvenile’s family was also required to file a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge the commitment 
because the juvenile court at this time did not allow appeals.  Id. 
42. Id.  
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 10. 
44. Melli, supra note 13, at 386. 
45. Id. (“Gault was followed by the incorporation of other criminal law protections into the pro-
cedures of the juvenile court—the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the prohibition 
against double jeopardy.”) (citations omitted). 
46. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970). 
47. Id. at 368.  
48. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1971). 
49. Preciado, supra note 14, at 580 (“The Court reasoned that to recognize a constitutional right 
would change the nature of the juvenile court by making it too adversarial and formal, effectively going 
against the original design of the early juvenile court’s intentions.”). 
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juvenile court to be less formal and more rehabilitation focused.50 
The due process reforms transformed the juvenile court system from a re-
habilitation model to a more adversarial model.51  Not only did juvenile courts 
begin to focus on criminal conduct and due process rights following landmark 
decisions like Gault, but widespread concern that juveniles were being com-
mitted until the age of majority without successful rehabilitation demonstrated 
the need to initiate proportionate sentencing.52  Therefore, many states began 
setting definite terms of commitment, with possible court-ordered extensions 
to ensure both equitable sentencing among juveniles and that juvenile sentences 
are comparable to adult sentencing for similar criminal conduct.53  Under the 
more adversarial, equitable form of juvenile justice, punishment began to re-
flect the seriousness of the offense while considering the criminal code’s sen-
tencing limitations for the same crime if committed by an adult.54  This in turn 
caused courts and legislatures to consider how to handle more serious juvenile 
offenders, or rather, those offenders whose conduct was deemed too heinous 
for the punishments available under the juvenile justice code.55 
While more formal procedures and more proportionate sentencing have 
been introduced in juvenile court proceedings to create a more criminalized ju-
venile court system, the juvenile system by nature is only meant to retain con-
trol over delinquent juveniles until they reach the age of majority.56  Therefore, 
many states have created legislation that removes serious offenders from the 
juvenile court jurisdiction and waives those offenders into the adult system to 
ensure more appropriate sentencing.57 
B. Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice Code and Classification of Serious Juvenile 
Offenders 
Prior to 1996, the Wisconsin’s Children’s Code aimed to protect the best 
 
50. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. 
51. Melli, supra note 13, at 387 (mentioning three significant juvenile court reforms, “the limi-
tation of delinquency to criminal conduct, the introduction of prosecuting attorneys, and determinate 
and proportionate sentencing”). 
52. Id. at 389 (“Looking at the juvenile court system from the perspective of the criminal justice 
system, reformers were concerned about the fairness of juvenile court open-ended disposition.”). 
53. Id. (for example, in Gault, the minor was sentenced to six years although the maximum adult 
sentence was a sixty-day jail sentence). 
54. Id. at 390.  
55. Id. at 390–91. 
56. Id. at 392 (noting that “criminalization” of the juvenile court was a response to public concern 
that the creation of a rehabilitation-focused juvenile court had failed, which resulted in an increased 
use of criminal court jurisdiction for serious juvenile offenders and harsher penalties). 
57. Id.  
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interest of the child and help those children in need of protection.58  Following 
legislative reform in July of 1996, the Juvenile Justice Code, which is codified 
in Chapter 938 of the Wisconsin Statutes, began to shift focus by moving away 
from rehabilitation and more towards punishment and juvenile accountability, 
where delinquent offenders were considered separate from status offenders.59 
The Code underwent remarkable changes, such as adopting the age of ten 
to be the threshold for delinquency in order to establish accountability at an 
earlier age and allowing seventeen-year-old juveniles to be prosecuted under 
adult criminal court.60  Furthermore, the Code expanded original criminal juris-
diction to juveniles ten and older who “commit[] or attempt[] to commit first-
degree intentional homicide, or who have committed first-degree reckless hom-
icide, or second degree intentional homicide.”61  Additionally, Wisconsin abol-
ished the juvenile’s right to a jury trial.62  The Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code 
exemplifies the transition from the original purpose of the juvenile court to re-
habilitate the youth and prevent continued criminal conduct to a more adver-
sarial process that focuses on accountability.63 The transition has left gaps in 
how to approach juvenile justice and the gap of greatest concern is how a court 
is to treat serious juvenile offenders and whether original adult court jurisdic-
tion is the answer.64 
 
58. Preciado, supra note 14, at 584–85.  
Prior to July 1, 1996, the juvenile code was listed under Chapter 48 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, which maintained the same legislative intent for all youths, 
whether labeled “child victim” or “juvenile offender.” As of July 1, 1996, the 
Code was renamed the Juvenile Justice Code and now resides as Chapter 938, a 
largely symbolic move that has pushed juveniles next to the Criminal Code, serv-
ing as a warning to juveniles that “they’re almost there.” 
Id. at 585. 
59. Id. at 585–86.  (“The JJC makes an effort to deal only with juvenile delinquency and not 
commingle delinquent juveniles, or those who violate the law, with those juveniles who are in need of 
protection. Juveniles in need of protection are not carried over into Chapter 938, but are left behind in 
Chapter 48 of the Children’s Code.”).  Note that status offender refers to an offense that is punishable 
because the offender is a juvenile where the same offense would not be subject to a criminal charge if 
the offender was an adult.  See WIS. STAT. § 938.999 (2013–2014).  
60. Preciado, supra note 14, at 586 (“[S]eventeen, as opposed to eighteen, ‘would benefit early 
intervention programs and impose greater accountability for the most mature juveniles who violate 
criminal laws.’”). 
61. Id. (noting that the decrease in age from twelve to ten has “[t]he effect [] that a ten-year-old 
can now be held delinquent, whereas previously he or she would have been considered in need of 
protection”). 
62. Id. at 587 (stating that jury trials are expensive and are often used for negotiation of pleas, 
“which interferes with the rehabilitation and personal accountability goals of the juvenile justice sys-
tem”). 
63. Melli, supra note 13, at 392. 
64. See generally Breann Boggs et al., Treatment of Juveniles in the Wisconsin Criminal Court 
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III. JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION VERSUS ORIGINAL ADULT JURISDICTION 
IN WISCONSIN 
A. Waiver and Reverse Waiver Proceedings 
Waiver and reverse waiver proceedings are a vital part of due process.65  
The transfer of juveniles to criminal court to be prosecuted under the adult crim-
inal code has continuously been justified by finding that the juvenile court is 
not capable of handling those juvenile offenders who commit serious crimes 
and determining that handling those juveniles under an adult criminal court is 
best because the criminal court can impose harsher punishments.66  This trans-
fer policy was enacted in a large majority of states, including Wisconsin.67  Fur-
ther, states, like Wisconsin, made the transfer procedures easier by establishing 
“offense-based, categorical, and absolute alternatives to individualized, of-
fender-oriented waiver proceedings in the juvenile court” or by lowering the 
age at which a juvenile is transferred automatically to adult criminal court ju-
risdiction.68 
In Wisconsin, section 938.183(1) governs whether the adult court has ex-
clusive original jurisdiction over juveniles.69  As mentioned previously, a juve-
nile that has reached the age of seventeen at the time of the crime is prosecuted 
as an adult for any violations of the law.70  However, juveniles younger than 
seventeen may be prosecuted as adults in criminal court as required by Wiscon-
sin Statutes section 938.183.71 
 
System: An Analysis of Potential Alternatives, Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs 
(2008), https://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/images/publications/workshops/2008-juvenile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/76XJ-CXSB]. See also Streit, supra note 15, at 43; Preciado, supra note 14, at 586–
87. 
65. See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  
66. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & 
JUST. 81, 81–82 (2000).   
67. Id.; Melli supra note 13, at 392 (“A recently enacted provision of the juvenile delinquency 
statutes in Wisconsin is a good example of the trend to a criminalized approach to juveniles.”). 
68. Bishop, supra note 66, at 84.  
69. WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1).  
70. 9 CHRISTINE WISEMAN & MICHAEL TOBIN, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 10:1 (2d ed. 2015).  
71. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1): 
(1) JUVENILES UNDER ADULT COURT JURISDICTION.  Notwithstanding
 ss. 938.12 (1) and 938.18, courts of criminal jurisdiction have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over all of the following: 
(a)  A juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged to 
have violated s. 940.20 (1) or 946.43 while placed in a juvenile correctional 
facility, a juvenile detention facility, or a secured residential care center for 
children and youth or who has been adjudicated delinquent and who is alleged 
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Pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 938.183, any juvenile accused of 
battery or assault while in custody or any juvenile over the age of ten who is 
charged with attempted first-degree homicide, first-degree reckless homicide, 
or second-degree intentional homicide will be subject to the original jurisdic-
tion of the criminal court.72  Additionally, if a juvenile commits a crime after 
waiving juvenile court jurisdiction, during waiver proceedings, or after the 
adult criminal court had already exercised original jurisdiction over the juvenile 
the criminal court will retain jurisdiction.73 
Unlike delinquency proceedings within juvenile court, a juvenile prose-
cuted in adult criminal court is subject to those penalties and punishments out-
lined by the criminal code.74  Often, the sentencing associated with the criminal 
code is significantly harsher than the sentencing options available in juvenile 
court.75  This difference in sentencing has led courts to adopt a waiver procedure 
where the juvenile court is able to assess the facts of the crime, the relevant 
waiver factors, and determine if the offender will be best served under the crim-
inal code.76 
 
to have committed a violation of s. 940.20 (2m). 
(am)  A juvenile who is alleged to have attempted or committed a violation 
of s. 940.01 or to have committed a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05 on or after 
the juveniles 10th birthday. 
(ar)  A juvenile specified in par. (a) or (am) who is alleged to have attempted 
or committed a violation of any state criminal law in addition to the violation 
alleged under par. (a) or (am) if the violation alleged under this paragraph and 
the violation alleged under par. (a) or (am) may be joined under s. 971.12 (1). 
(b)  A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the 
juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation following waiver of juris-
diction under s. 48.18, 1993 stats., or s. 938.18 by the court assigned to exer-
cise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 or if the court assigned to exer-
cise jurisdiction under this chapter and ch. 48 has waived its jurisdiction over 
the juvenile for a previous violation and criminal proceedings on that previous 
violation are still pending. 
(c)  A juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state criminal law if the 
juvenile has been convicted of a previous violation over which the court of 
criminal jurisdiction had original jurisdiction under this section or if proceed-
ings on a previous violation over which the court of criminal jurisdiction has 
original jurisdiction under this section are still pending. 
72. WISEMAN, supra note 70.  
73. Id.   
74. Id.  
75. Vielmetti, supra note 2 (discussing how sentencing options differ depending on whether the 
girls being prosecuted in the Slenderman trial are under juvenile court jurisdiction or adult court juris-
diction, where the juvenile system allows a maximum of three years of punishment rather than a larger 
sentence under adult criminal code jurisdiction).  
76. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:6. 
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A “waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically important’ action determining vi-
tally important statutory rights of the juvenile” because the juvenile court has 
original jurisdiction along with special rights and immunities over juveniles that 
are unavailable in the criminal code.77 
A landmark case demonstrating the impact of the waiver hearing is Kent v. 
United States.78  In Kent, the Supreme Court held that a hearing must be given 
to the juvenile prior to allowing the waiver order where an offender is entitled 
to a “meaningful review” of the facts that motivate the waiver and a detailed 
explanation of the conclusion of the court.79  Moreover, the Supreme Court held 
that under prior precedent,80 the offender is entitled to legal counsel as well as 
a hearing to meet the minimum due process rights afforded to juveniles.81  Fol-
lowing the Kent decision in 1966, the judicial waiver process in courts across 
the country has become increasingly formalized where each juvenile is given a 
formal hearing during which the waiver request is evaluated according to the 
state’s explicit criteria.82  For instance, in Wisconsin, a juvenile that is subject 
to a waiver hearing is afforded the same rights as a criminal defendant with the 
exception of a jury and the rules of evidence.83 
Pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes sections 938.18(4) and 938.18(1) and (5), 
the waiver hearing involves a two-part inquiry within the juvenile court.84  
Upon receiving a petition requesting waiver of jurisdiction, the juvenile court 
determines if the proceedings have prosecutorial merit.85  If there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the juvenile “probably committed” the crime, the state 
will meet the burden of proving prosecutorial merit.86  Then, the court considers 
if the jurisdictional factors under Wisconsin Statutes section 938.18(1) are pre-
sent.87 
 
77. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). For instance, the court in Kent discusses 
how juveniles under juvenile court jurisdiction are protected from publicity, are not jailed with adults, 
and can only be detained until the age of twenty-one.  Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 561. 
80. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 106–07 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Watkins v. United States, 
343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964).  Note that the due process rights available to juvenile offenders are 
equivalent to the due process rights available for adult offenders under the criminal code.  See id. 
81. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561–62 (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959)). 
82. Bishop, supra note 66, at 88–89. 
83. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:2.  
84. Id. § 10:5.  
85. Id.; State v. Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 356 Wis. 2d 642, 851 N.W.2d 251. 
86. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:5. (“Thus, the juvenile court first determines whether the 
matter has prosecutive merit under Wis. St. § 938.18(4), and then determines whether to waive its 
jurisdiction under Wis. St. § 938.18(5), if indeed it found prosecutive merit to the charges.”). 
87. WIS. STAT. § 938.18(1) (2013–2014) factors include the following:   
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Once the court establishes there is prosecutorial merit and a jurisdictional 
factor is met, the second part of the waiver inquiry is conducted.88  During the 
second inquiry, the court determines whether to waive jurisdiction considering 
the criteria outlined in Wisconsin Statutes section 938.18(5).89 
Upon consideration of the criteria, if the court determines there is clear and 
convincing evidence to demonstrate that it would be “contrary to the best inter-
ests of the juvenile or of the public to hear the case,” the judge can waive juris-
diction.90  Only upon completion of the waiver hearing will the adult criminal 
 
(a)  The juvenile is alleged to have violated s. 940.03, 940.06, 940.225 (1) or (2), 
940.305, 940.31, 943.10 (2), 943.32 (2), 943.87 or 961.41 (1) on or after the ju-
venile’s 14th birthday. 
(b)  The juvenile is alleged to have committed a violation on or after the juvenile’s 
14th birthday at the request of or for the benefit of a criminal gang, as defined 
in s. 939.22 (9), that would constitute a felony under chs. 939 to 948 or 961 if 
committed by an adult. 
(c)  The juvenile is alleged to have violated any state criminal law on or after the 
juvenile’s 15th birthday. 
88. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:5. (“The second stage of the waiver hearing involves the ju-
venile court’s consideration of the criteria for waiver enumerated in Wis. St. § 938.18(5), and its de-
termination to waive jurisdiction.”). 
89. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 938.18(5) (2013–2014): 
(5)  CRITERIA FOR WAIVER. If prosecutive merit is found, the court shall base 
its decision whether to waive jurisdiction on the following criteria: 
(a)  The personality of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile has a men-
tal illness or developmental disability, the juvenile’s physical and mental ma-
turity, and the juvenile’s pattern of living, prior treatment history, and appar-
ent potential for responding to future treatment. 
(am) The prior record of the juvenile, including whether the court has previ-
ously waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile, whether the juvenile has been 
previously convicted following a waiver of the court’s jurisdiction or has been 
previously found delinquent, whether such conviction or delinquency in-
volved the infliction of serious bodily injury, the juvenile’s motives and atti-
tudes, and the juveniles prior offenses. 
(b)  The type and seriousness of the offense, including whether it was against 
persons or property and the extent to which it was committed in a violent, 
aggressive, premeditated or willful manner. 
(c)  The adequacy and suitability of facilities, services and procedures availa-
ble for treatment of the juvenile and protection of the public within the juve-
nile justice system, and, where applicable, the mental health system and the 
suitability of the juvenile for placement in the serious juvenile offender pro-
gram under s. 938.538 or the adult intensive sanctions program under s. 
301.048. 
(d)  The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
if the juvenile was allegedly associated in the offense with persons who will 
be charged with a crime in the court of criminal jurisdiction. 
90. § 938.18(6) (2013–2014).  
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court be given exclusive jurisdiction over the juvenile’s proceedings.91  How-
ever, if the petition for a waiver is uncontested the court will consider the ca-
pacity of the juvenile to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily decide not to 
contest waiver prior to evaluating the criteria outlined in Wisconsin Statutes 
section 938.18(5).92 
To retain flexibility over the juvenile’s criminal proceedings, the adult 
criminal court may conduct a “reverse waiver” proceeding to determine 
whether or not to transfer the case from criminal court to juvenile court despite 
the criminal court’s original jurisdiction.93  In State v. Kleser, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that a juvenile has the right to a reverse waiver hearing 
following the criminal court’s finding of probable cause to hold exclusive ju-
risdiction over the juvenile regarding the crime the juvenile was accused of.94  
The criminal court must retain jurisdiction unless the juvenile, during the course 
of the reverse waiver hearings, proves by a preponderance of evidence that each 
of the following factors is present: 
(a) [T]hat, if convicted, the child could not receive adequate 
treatment in the criminal justice system; 
(b) [T]hat transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to ex-
ercise jurisdiction under chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate 
the seriousness of the offense; 
(c) [T]hat retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the ju-
venile or other juveniles from committing the violation of 
which the juvenile is accused [under the circumstances speci-
fied in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is 
applicable].95 
 
91. WISEMAN, supra note 70, § 10:6.  
92. Id. § 10:5. 
Whether the state is required to present testimony beyond the delinquency 
and waiver petitions to support the waiver determination during the second stage 
of the inquiry depends, according to the newly-enacted provisions of Wis. St. § 
938.18(4)(b) and (4)(c), on whether the juvenile contests the waiver. If the waiver 
petition is uncontested by the juvenile, the court need only inquire into the juve-
nile’s capacity to effect a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of juvenile 
court jurisdiction. If the court is satisfied that the juvenile’s decision not to contest 
the waiver meets the traditional criteria, no additional testimony need be taken. 
The court may make its determination to waive juvenile court jurisdiction on the 
record before it, although its determination must reflect the criteria enumerated 
in Wis. St. § 938.18(5).  
93. Id. § 10:1. 
94. State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶ 128, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144.   
95. WISEMAN, supra note 70 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2)). 
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The Kleser court held that a juvenile must be able to offer evidence to sat-
isfy his or her burden on all three elements, including evidence about the of-
fense to put the act in context, but evidence cannot be offered to contradict the 
charged offense.96  This reverse waiver hearing procedure was recently demon-
strated in the Slenderman case, where the judge determined that the adult crim-
inal court must retain exclusive and original jurisdiction over the two twelve-
year-old girls because transferring jurisdiction to juvenile court would depreci-
ate the seriousness of the pre-meditated offense.97  Following the decision, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision leaving the 
girls subject to the criminal court’s jurisdiction because of the seriousness of 
the offense.98 
The judicial waiver statutes often gave judges broad discretion in consider-
ing a multitude of eligibility factors, and while their discretion was limited by 
the Kent decision, the factors are subjectively applied to each juvenile and the 
decision as to what court holds original and exclusive jurisdiction affects the 
sentencing options available if the juvenile is found guilty.99  The sentencing 
options available differ so greatly between those juveniles placed under the 
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the adult criminal court than those juve-
niles who remain in the Juvenile Justice Code that numerous law reviews have 
discussed both the benefit and harm that may come from prosecuting children 
who commit “serious” crimes under the adult system.100 
B. Sentencing in Wisconsin: The Difference Between Juvenile Court 
Sentencing and Adult Criminal Court Sentencing 
A juvenile can be placed under adult court jurisdiction by judicial waiver, 
automatic transfer, prosecutorial discretion, or because the adult court has orig-
inal jurisdiction,101 as is in the Slenderman case.102  While states vary on how 
to define the jurisdiction and purpose of juvenile courts, all states have enacted 
 
96. Id. (stating that evidence to contradict the offense may not be presented at the reverse waiver 
hearing but is permitted at the preliminary examination).  
97. Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
98. Associated Press, Wisconsin Girls Should Be Tried as Adults in Slender Man Attack, Ap-
peals Court Rules, FOX NEWS U.S. (July 27, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/07/27/wiscons
in-girls-lose-appeal-in-slender-man-attack.html [https://perma.cc/59TH-XBUJ]. 
99. Bishop, supra note 66, at 88–89. 
100. Id. at 84–85; Melli, supra note 13, at 392; Streit, supra note 15, at 39. 
101. Bree Langemo, Serious Consequences for Serious Juvenile Offenders: Do Juveniles Belong 
in Adult Court?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 141 (2004). 
102. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
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some waiver laws that allow juveniles to fall under adult criminal court juris-
diction based on age or seriousness of their offense.103  As a result, juveniles 
prosecuted under a state’s juvenile code will experience a number of procedural 
differences than a juvenile prosecuted under the adult criminal code.104 
First, a juvenile in adult criminal court will experience longer, more drawn 
out proceedings where their anonymity and confidentiality will not be pro-
tected.105  A juvenile in juvenile court will remain anonymous and information 
will be confidential and his or her civil rights, such as the right to vote, will not 
be affected.106  Second, juveniles under both systems are given due process 
rights, including the right to counsel, but only juveniles prosecuted in the adult 
system will have a right to a jury.107  Third, the juvenile system includes flexi-
bility to terminate or extend supervision as a result of a juvenile offender’s re-
sponse to his or her initial confinement.108  Last, and potentially most signifi-
cant, the sentencing and punishments available to judges are determined by the 
code under which the juvenile is being prosecuted.109 
The juvenile code, despite its increased focus on punishment, takes a more 
rehabilitative and deterrent approach, which limits a judge’s power to impose 
lengthy incarceration sentences.110  On the other hand, the adult criminal code 
exposes a juvenile to longer, harsher sentences often mandated by statute, 
which results in the juvenile spending time incarcerated with adults in state 
 
103. Langemo, supra note 101, at 141 (“To accomplish this goal [of punishing and deterring 
juvenile crime], states have made it easier to waive juvenile defendants into adult court by utilizing 
one of three methods: judicial waiver, automatic transfer, or prosecutorial discretion.”). 
104. Id. at 145.  
105. Id. at 151–52. 
106. Id. at 152. 
107. Id. at 151–52. 
108. Streit, supra note 15, at 40.  
109. Langemo, supra note 101, at 154 (“While some states consider youthfulness as a mitigating 
factor, it is only one factor of many considered when imposing a sentence and is within the judge’s 
discretion.  Under federal sentencing guidelines, youthfulness, as a mitigating factor, is explicitly re-
jected.”). 
110. Id. at 153. 
The majority of states permit the imposition of life without parole or even man-
date it upon conviction of juveniles in adult court. For example, in Washington, 
eight-year-olds can be subject to life without parole, and ten-year-olds in Ver-
mont can also be sentenced to life without parole if convicted in adult court. In 
Florida, Lionel Tate, at twelve years old, killed a playmate and was tried in adult 
court and convicted of first-degree murder. The conviction carries a mandatory 
life without parole sentence. 
Note, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated statutes that mandate life without parole 
for juveniles.   
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prisons.111  While state statutes vary on the sentencing options available to a 
judge regarding juveniles prosecuted for serious crimes either in criminal court 
or in juvenile court, this Comment will only discuss the sentencing options 
available to judges within Wisconsin regarding those juveniles who are eligible 
for adult criminal court proceedings based on age and seriousness of the of-
fense.112 
C. Sentencing in Light of the Serious Juvenile Offender Program 
The Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code assumes juvenile offenders will 
quickly improve their behaviors through rehabilitation-focused programs, and 
as a result the usual disposition length is one year with the possibility of annual 
reviews.113  For juveniles who commit more serious offenses but remain under 
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, Wisconsin has a Serious Juvenile Offender 
Program that allows a juvenile to stay in custody for up to three years.114 Alter-
natively, a juvenile who is retained under the adult criminal court’s jurisdiction 
faces long periods of incarceration with less focus on rehabilitation.115  To un-
derstand how dramatically the sentencing may differ under the two court sys-
tems, the Slenderman case, as discussed earlier, can serve as an example.116 
Two twelve-year-old girls were charged with attempted first-degree inten-
tional homicide in Wisconsin, a serious “Class B” offense that automatically 
places the girls under adult criminal court jurisdiction pursuant to Wisconsin 
Statutes section 938.183(1)(am).117  In a reverse waiver hearing that aimed to 
place the girls back under juvenile court jurisdiction, the trial court judge ruled 
that a three-year incarceration with supervision until age eighteen in the juve-
nile justice system was not sufficient punishment.118  Specifically, the judge 
expressed concern over the inability to supervise the girls after they reach the 
age of majority and how a lighter sentence under the Juvenile Justice Code may 
 
111. Id. at 152–53. 
112. Bishop, supra note 66, at 115.  
113. Streit, supra note 15, at 39.  
The juvenile system assumes that offenders will make fairly rapid developmental 
improvements with the assistance of appropriate rehabilitation programs. The 
normal disposition length in juvenile court is one year, with the possibility of 
annual reviews if the targeted changes have not yet occurred. For the most serious 
offenses, initial dispositions can be to a multiphase Serious Juvenile Offender 
Program . . . . 
114. Id. at 39–40; WIS. STAT. § 938.538.  
115. Streit, supra note 15, at 39. 
116. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
117. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(am).  
118. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
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depreciate the seriousness of the offense and may not deter or protect the public 
from future crimes.119 
Under the Juvenile Justice Code in Wisconsin, the type of offense commit-
ted by the juvenile determines the classification of the offense, which dictates 
the sentencing options available to the presiding judge.120  A juvenile charged 
with first-degree intentional homicide falls under a “Class A” distinction, 
whereas a juvenile charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, 
second-degree intentional homicide, or first-degree reckless homicide is 
viewed as a “Class B” distinction.121  While the Serious Juvenile Offender Pro-
gram in Wisconsin covers both “Class A” and “Class B” offenses, the available 
sentencing options differ.122  The two twelve-year-old girls, as “Class B” of-
fenders, could receive a maximum sentence of three years in secure custody 
with supervision until age eighteen under Wisconsin’s Serious Juvenile Of-
fender Program.”123  However, if either girl was classified as a “Class A” juve-
nile offender she could be held in secure custody in a juvenile correctional fa-
cility up until her twenty-fifth birthday.124  This limit on supervision often leads 
to an adult court retaining exclusive jurisdiction because it finds a longer sen-
tence is necessary to not only deter the juvenile but to protect the public.125 
For a juvenile under adult criminal court jurisdiction, the sentencing avail-
able for first-degree intentional homicide would not necessarily be limited to 
secure custody until the age of twenty-five but would more likely result in a 
longer sentence.126  In Wisconsin, first-degree intentional homicide is a “Class 
A” felony that carries a mandatory life sentence.127  A twelve-year-old juvenile 
charged with intentional first-degree homicide is automatically subject to adult 
criminal court jurisdiction and assuming the juvenile is not reverse waived to 
juvenile court, the juvenile will be subject to that mandatory life sentence.128  
 
119. Id. (noting this fear was also expressed as a factor in the court of appeals decision to affirm 
the trial court judge’s ruling).  
120. § 940.01(1)(a); § 939.32(1)(a). 
121. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); § 939.32(1)(a); § 940.01(1)(a).   
122. § 939.32(1)(a); § 940.01(1)(a). 
123. § 939.32(1)(a); § 938.538(3)(a)(1).   
124. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); § 940.01(1)(a); Streit, supra note 15, at 40 (stating that the maximum 
sentences for adults are increasing in length so the disparity in confinement between juvenile court and 
adult court has grown making it easier to move more juveniles to adult court jurisdiction).  
125. Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
126. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); § 940.01(1)(a); Streit, supra note 15, at 40. 
127. § 939.50(3)(a); § 940.01(1)(a). See State v. Deal, 2010AP1804-CR, 2011 Wis. App. LEXIS 
753 at *9–10 (September 20, 2011). 
128. § 939.50(3)(a). 
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While the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons prevented the impo-
sition of the death penalty upon juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen, 
Wisconsin courts have held that neither Roper nor the Eighth Amendment pre-
clude a court from sentencing a juvenile who committed first-degree intentional 
homicide to life imprisonment.129  Thus, in Wisconsin, juveniles convicted of 
first-degree intentional homicide would be held in secure custody at a juvenile 
correctional facility until their eighteenth birthday, at which time they would 
be transferred to a state prison to serve the remainder of their sentence.130 
Similarly, in the Slenderman case, the two twelve-year-old girls charged 
with attempted first-degree intentional homicide under the adult criminal code 
could be sentenced to a maximum term of up to sixty years of imprisonment if 
they are convicted of the charged crime of attempted first-degree intentional 
homicide.131 
The maximum sentences available in adult criminal court proceedings re-
sult in significantly larger potential sentences than those maximum sentencing 
options available in the juvenile court proceedings.132  The two twelve-year-old 
girls, if convicted of attempted first-degree intentional homicide in the juvenile 
justice system, could face up to three years of secure custody in a juvenile cor-
rectional facility with continued supervision until their eighteenth birthday.133  
However, if the two twelve-year-old girls are convicted of attempted first-de-
gree intentional homicide under the adult criminal code they could face up to 
sixty years in prison.134  Three years of custody may seem to be a dispropor-
tionately light penalty for a twelve-year-old stabbing a friend nineteen times, 
but on the other hand sentencing a juvenile to a large remainder of their life in 
prison may seem disproportionately harsh.135  While there is no mandatory min-
imum for attempted first-degree intentional homicide and a judge may not nec-
essarily impose the maximum term of imprisonment, there is no guarantee that 
the troubled juveniles will not be subjected to a significant amount of time in 
adult prison upon reaching the age of majority.136 
In Wisconsin, the options presented above—a maximum sentence of three 
years under the Juvenile Justice Code or a maximum sentence of up to sixty 
 
129. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, 
¶ 77, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451.  
130. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
131. §§ 939.32(1)(a), 939.50(3)(b). 
132. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 939.50(3)(b); Vielmetti, supra note 2.   
133. § 938.538(3)(a)(1).  
134. §§ 939.32(1)(a), 939.50(3)(b). 
135. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
136. § 939.50(3)(b). 
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years under the adult criminal code—are the only options available to those 
juveniles who commit “Class B” felony offenses.137  While Wisconsin is aware 
of this gap in sentencing options, it has only remedied the gap for juveniles that 
commit “Class A” offenses.138  The Serious Juvenile Offender program recog-
nizes the need for expanded supervision and allows juveniles found guilty of 
“Class A” offenses to remain in a juvenile correctional facility under secure 
custody until their twenty-fifth birthday.139  This option is currently not availa-
ble for those juveniles guilty of “Class B” offenses.140  Therefore, a juvenile 
who is convicted of attempted first-degree intentional homicide in adult crimi-
nal court may be subjected to sixty years imprisonment to be carried out in state 
prison after his or her eighteenth birthday but a juvenile that is convicted of 
first-degree intentional homicide in juvenile court may be permitted to carry 
out their sentence in a juvenile correctional facility until they turn twenty-
five.141  This gap is what leaves the court attempting to decide whether to sub-
ject a “Class B” offender to a relatively short time in secure custody or to carry 
out a harsh and lengthy  sentence.142  This gap is what must be remedied to 
allow juvenile court judges more discretion in sentencing “Class B” offend-
ers.143 
 
 
 
137. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 939.50(3)(b); Vielmetti, supra note 2.   
138. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); see Streit, supra note 15, at 40.  
139. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m); see Streit, supra note 15, at 40. 
140. § 938.538 (3)(a)(1).  
141. § 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m); see Streit, supra note 15, at 40. 
142. Vielmetti, supra note 2.   
143. It important to note that other states have attempted to address the same gap within their 
legislation.  For instance, in Montana, the legislature created blended sentencing for juvenile offenders 
under the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act (EJPA).  Robert E. Henderson, Comment, Blended 
Sentencing in Montana: A New Way to Look At An Old Problem, 61 MONT. L. REV. 337, 339 (2000).  
In 1995, the original EJPA was created to allow youth court judges to retain jurisdiction over juveniles 
that committed “felony” offenses by imposing juvenile and disposition and adult sentences, where the 
adult sentence was stayed unless the juvenile committed another offense.  Id.  In 1999, the EJPA was 
amended to avoid subjecting juveniles to potentially longer sentences as the original EJPA did by 
combining juvenile disposition with adult sentences.  Id.  The legislature believed the EJPA’s focus on 
meaningful and serious consequences through extended juvenile jurisdiction would be an effective 
forum for rehabilitation and treatment.  Id. at 353.  While the revised EJPA aimed to extend juvenile 
jurisdiction for some offenses, it also removed some serious offenses, such as offenses “punishable by 
death, life imprisonment, or a sentence of 100 years,” from the program recognizing that some juvenile 
offenses should remain under adult criminal jurisdiction.  Id. at 354.  Despite its attempts, EJPA failed 
to address the gap between those individuals that are able to benefit from the extended juvenile juris-
diction where the EJPA tends to extend jurisdiction to only those juveniles that commit property of-
fenses.  Id.  
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IV. PROPOSAL: EXPAND SENTENCING OPTIONS FOR “CLASS B” SERIOUS 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS UNDER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE 
The Wisconsin Juvenile Justice Code needs to be altered to allow presiding 
judges to sentence “Class B” juvenile offenders to expanded supervision in ju-
venile correctional facilities under the Serious Juvenile Offender Program, sim-
ilar to the sentencing options available for “Class A” juvenile offenders.  Spe-
cifically, Wisconsin should extend the length of time in a juvenile correctional 
facility available to “Class B” serious juvenile offenders until the age of twenty-
five, as it is for “Class A” serious juvenile offenders.144  “Class A” and “Class 
B” juvenile offenders are considered serious offenders and are subject to origi-
nal adult jurisdiction for criminal proceedings under Wisconsin Statutes section 
938.183.145 
Wisconsin, through its reconstruction of the former Children’s Code into 
the Juvenile Justice Code, has increasingly aimed to issue punishment, provide 
protection for society, and afford juveniles due process rights.146  Despite this 
change, the Serious Juvenile Offender Program is limited to juveniles ages four-
teen or over who have committed or conspired to commit a variety of serious 
crimes,147 and juveniles over the age of ten adjudicated for attempting to com-
mit or committing a violation of section 940.01 or committing section 940.02 
or section 940.05 offenses.148 
Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538 outlines the guidelines of the Serious 
Juvenile Offender Program, including the sanctions allowed for “Class A” of-
fenders.149  The statute explicitly allows the court to hold a juvenile who com-
mitted an offense, considered a “Class A” felony if committed by an adult, in a 
Type 1150 juvenile correctional facility until the juvenile reaches twenty-five 
 
144. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).  
145. § 938.183(1)(am). 
146. Preciado, supra note 14, at 575.  
147. WIS. STAT. § 938.34(4h)(a) outlines what conditions must apply in order to place a juvenile 
in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program:  
(a) The juvenile is 14 years of age or over and has been adjudicated delinquent 
for committing or conspiring to commit a violation of s. 
939.32(1)(a), 940.03, 940.06, 940.21, 940.225(1), 940.305, 940.31, 941.327(2)(
b)4., 943.02, 943.10(2), 943.23(1g), 943.32(2),948.02(1), 948.025(1), 
or 948.30(2) or attempting a violation of s. 943.32(2) or the juvenile is 10 years 
of age or over and has been adjudicated delinquent for attempting or committing 
a violation of s. 940.01 or for committing a violation of s. 940.02 or 940.05. 
148. Id.  
149. Id.; § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).  
150. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 938.02, a Type 1 juvenile correctional facility is a correctional 
facility excluding those under sections 938.533(3)(b), 938.538(4)(b), or 938.539(5) whereas a Type 2 
juvenile correctional facility is a correctional facility that meets the criteria solely because of s. 
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years old.151  However, this extension is only available to “Class A” juvenile 
offenders whereas all other juveniles placed in a juvenile correctional facility 
cannot be held for more than three years.152 
Presumably, the reason for this distinction is that “Class A” felonies are 
considered the most serious offenses.153  However, it does not seem appropriate 
to allow “Class A” offenders guilty of first-degree intentional homicide to be 
prosecuted under the Juvenile Justice Code, where they are placed under the 
serious offender program giving judges the discretion to extend their supervi-
sion until the age of twenty-five, but to not allow judges the same option for 
those “Class B” offenders guilty of attempted first-degree intentional homi-
cide.154  As a result, “Class B” offenders guilty of a heinous and serious crime 
with a less serious outcome are limited to three years under the Juvenile Justice 
Code.155  To prevent these offenders from being rewarded with seemingly light 
sentences, “Class B” offenders may be more likely kept under adult criminal 
court original jurisdiction to ensure the judge has increased sentencing options 
available to meet the factual circumstances of the juvenile offender’s case.156 
This Comment aims to not only expose this gap in sentencing, but proposes 
a slight change in legislation that would prevent the presiding judge from being 
forced to accept a lower sentence than believed necessary under the Juvenile 
Justice Code or subject the juvenile offender to the potentially harsh sentences 
available under the adult criminal code.  Other scholars have noted the potential 
for harsh dispositions for young-adult offenders between the ages of seventeen 
and twenty-four under Wisconsin’s current truth-in-sentencing regime and have 
proposed concurrent non-truth-in-sentencing options to allow juveniles to earn 
early release through good behavior.157  While proposals such as the one sug-
gested above aim to give judges more discretion in their sentencing by remedy-
ing the amount of time to be served it does not expand the sentencing options 
 
938.533(3)(b), 938.538(4)(b), or 938.539(5). Further, the Type 2 facilities are defined under WIS. 
STAT. section 938.357(4) where a juvenile placed in a Type 2 juvenile correctional facility or secured 
residential care center for children is under the supervision of the department of corrections and is 
considered to be in custody, being subject to the rules and discipline of the department of corrections.  
151. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m).  
152. Id. 
153. Melli, supra note 13, at 390; Hon. Dennis Barry, Juvenile Justice: A Wisconsin Blueprint 
For Change, WIS. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 31.  
154. § 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m).   
155. Id.  
156. Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
157. Streit, supra note 15, at 41 (“For indeterminate sentences, judges issue a single total sen-
tence and release is determined by the Parole Commission. The remaining unserved portion is parole 
time; for serious violations, authorities may revoke the offender’s parole and order the offender re-
turned to prison.”). 
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for those offenders not considered “Class A.”158  Failure to expand the sentenc-
ing options beyond three years under the Juvenile Justice Code still leaves the 
potential for harsh dispositions, which are generally objected to by the public.159 
“Class B” offenders commit serious crimes, like “Class A” offenders, but 
are effectively punished for failing to complete a homicide under sentencing 
guidelines.160  While “Class A” juvenile offenders, like “Class B” juvenile of-
fenders, are often subjected to original jurisdiction in the adult criminal code, 
the sentencing available to judges regarding “Class A” offenders may make it 
more likely the juvenile’s reverse waiver will be granted in order to allow the 
juvenile access to rehabilitation and re-entry programs more prevalent in juve-
nile correctional departments.161  This line of reasoning was expressed in the 
Slenderman reverse waiver decision by both the trial court judge and the court 
of appeals.162  A “Class B” serious juvenile offender must be released after three 
years in the juvenile correctional facility, but the same offender can be held for 
a longer period of time to ensure proportionate punishment and protection of 
the public under the adult criminal code.163  Thus, the reverse waiver consider-
ations will not likely be deemed met as to justify transferring the juvenile back 
under juvenile court jurisdiction.164  This problem would be eliminated if a 
judge could instead find that “Class B” offenders be subjected to supervision 
up until their twenty-fifth birthday in the Serious Juvenile Offender Program.165 
In an era of rising violence and public concern regarding violent juvenile 
offenders, the inclusion of “Class B” serious juvenile offenders under Wiscon-
sin Statutes section 938.538 (3)(a)(1m) and allowance of judges to sentence 
 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 40–41; § 938.538(3)(a)(1).  
160. § 938.538(3)(a)(1)–(1m).  
161. Lahny R. Silva, The Best Interest Is The Child: A Historical Philosophy For Modern Issues, 
28 BYU J. PUB. L. 415, 436 (2014). 
162. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
163. § 938.538(3)(a)(1); § 939.50(3). 
164.  Vielmetti, supra note 2.; WISEMAN, supra note 70; WIS. STAT. § 970.032, which requires 
the criminal court to retain jurisdiction unless each of the following factors is present:  
(a) That, if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the 
criminal justice system. 
(b) That transferring jurisdiction to the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction un-
der chs. 48 and 938 would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense. 
(c) That retaining jurisdiction is not necessary to deter the juvenile or other juve-
niles from committing the violation of which the juvenile is accused under the 
circumstances specified in s. 938.183 (1) (a), (am), (ar), (b) or (c), whichever is 
applicable.. 
WIS. STAT. § 970.032(2)(a)–(c).  
165. § 938.538; § 970.032.  
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“Class B” offenders to supervision beyond the three-year maximum imposed 
on non-serious juvenile offenders will avoid the need to maintain adult juris-
diction in order to protect the public.166  Additionally, this modification to leg-
islation will likely result in an increased number of juvenile offenders being 
reverse-waived to juvenile court jurisdiction, where the juvenile system has 
programs in place to help those juvenile offenders manage the years of adoles-
cence that will be spent in custody.167  This proposal does not recommend that 
judges change their considerations regarding waiver and reverse waiver proce-
dures for serious juvenile offenders subjected to original adult criminal court 
jurisdiction but rather it suggests the need for legislative change that would 
generate greater flexibility in the sentencing of “Class B” juvenile offenders.  
While not all “Class B” juvenile offenders should be reverse-waived to juvenile 
court, those “Class B” offenders who would benefit from extended time with 
the programs provided under the juvenile justice system could remain under 
supervision instead of subjected to the harsh realities presented by placement 
in an adult correctional facility.168 
This Comment does not suggest that the juvenile court should retain juris-
diction over offenders that are near the age of majority simply because they 
serve to benefit from the treatment available nor does it suggest that all “Class 
B” juvenile offenders should be placed under the Serious Juvenile Offender 
Program until their twenty-fifth birthday.169  Rather, this proposal suggests cre-
ation of a third sentencing option for “Class B” juvenile offenders to parallel 
the sentencing options available for “Class A” juvenile offenders under the Se-
rious Juvenile Offender Program.  If the Wisconsin legislature were to adopt 
this proposal, the Serious Juvenile Offender Program would allow judges to 
sentence certain “Class B” offenders to extended placement beyond the age of 
majority to protect the public and determine appropriate length in sentencing 
while ensuring that those juvenile offenders can still benefit from the juvenile 
correctional facility programs.170 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the nature of juveniles and the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code, 
Wisconsin should amend the Serious Juvenile Offender Program outlined in 
 
166. § 938.538; § 970.032. 
167. § 970.032; Vielmetti, supra note 2.  
168. Streit, supra note 15, at 43.  
169. § 938.538. 
170. Streit, supra note 15, at 43.  
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Wisconsin Statutes section 938.538.171  Specifically, Wisconsin should expand 
section 938.538 (3)(a)(1m), allowing “Class A” juvenile offenders to remain in 
a juvenile correctional facility or secured residential care center until the age of 
twenty-five to “Class B” juvenile offenders.172  This amendment will not man-
date that “Class B” juvenile offenders remain under juvenile jurisdiction until 
their twenty-fifth birthday nor will it extend original, exclusive juvenile juris-
diction to twenty-five.173  This amendment will fill the gap that exists in sen-
tencing options available to judges regarding the supervision of juveniles below 
the age of majority that commit serious crimes that would be considered a 
“Class B” felony under the adult criminal code.174  By extending the ability to 
hold both “Class A” and “Class B” serious juvenile offenders to the age of 
twenty-five in juvenile correctional facilities, the offenses subject to original 
adult court jurisdiction for criminal proceedings will have similar sentencing 
options rather than being differentiated based on whether the violent offense 
was attempted or completed.175 
Beginning with the history of Wisconsin’s Juvenile Justice Code, this Com-
ment explored the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code in Part I.  This Comment 
differentiated between original, exclusive adult criminal jurisdiction in Part II 
discussed the use of waiver and reverse waiver proceedings for juveniles who 
commit serious offenses that potentially subject them to adult criminal court 
jurisdiction.  Part II also outlined the Serious Juvenile Offender Program and 
highlighted the gap in sentencing options available to courts regarding “Class 
B” juvenile offenders.  Finally, Part III detailed a proposed “third option” in 
sentencing “Class B” juvenile offenders that emulates the available options for 
sentencing “Class A” juvenile offenders. 
By exposing the gap in sentencing and suggesting an amendment to Wis-
consin Statutes section 938.538 to fill the gap, this Comment hopes to avoid the 
dilemma faced in the reverse waiver hearing in the Slenderman case due to 
current Wisconsin legislation.176  Expanding supervision of “Class B” juvenile 
 
171. § 938.538(3)(a)(1m). 
172. Id.  
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Vielmetti, supra note 2. 
* Articles Editor of the Marquette Law Review, J.D. 2017 Marquette University Law School, 
B.S. University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Judge Bohren for inspiring me to 
write a comment on the sentencing gaps that exist in the Juvenile Justice Code through his work 
on the Slenderman trial. 
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offenders will remove the need to subject juveniles to adult criminal court ju-
risdiction and harsh sentences unless that reality is deemed necessary to protect 
the public.  
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